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THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVE

Deaths of Art: David Carrier's
Metahistory of Artuniting
Gary Shapiro

Editor's Note: In 1989 a session of the Western Division of
the American Philosophical Association was devoted to
several commentaries on David Carrier's book Artwriting,
a history of recent American art criticism, which had been
reviewed by both art critics and philosophers. This article is
a critical commentary on Artwriting by Gary Shapiro. (A
reply by Carrier follows in the next article.)

In

c~""

AnwriUng [I], Da"1d
ha. •u<ceOOed
identifying a genre of thought and discourse that is vitally
important to the world of art, but that has not been subject
to the sort of detailed attention that such a discourse deserves, particularly from philosophers. Carrier's 'artwriting'
is the kind of writing on art that lies outside the rather
narrow disciplinary boundaries of art history. It is either
concerned with explaining the significance of the new and
the contemporary or--drawing on older traditions of speculative, philosophical art theory or on relatively informal
discourse oriented toward travel and personal observation
(like Ruskin's, for example)-it aims at placing art within a
context that would not be considered narrowly artistic.
Among the artwriters whom Carrier analyzes with unusual
care and grace are Clement Greenberg, Ernst Gombrich,
Michael Fried, Adrian Stokes, Rosalind Krauss and Joseph
Masheck. How, it might well be asked, has philosophical
aesthetics come to take seriously writers whose work it has
m~re often ignored as marginal, journalistic or wildly speculative? Let me take a leaf from Carrier's book to construct
something of a 'genealogy' [2] for his own procedure-that
is, where Carrier is concerned with showing how artwriters
construct genealogies to distribute value and significance to
artists and then constructs his own genealogy of twentiethcentury artwriters from Greenberg to Masheck, I want to
suggest a necessarily selective and abbreviated genealogy of
aesthetics over the last 100 years that can help to show both
why we should take Carrier's project seriously and what
questions we should be asking about it.
Following Arthur Dan to, Carrier argues that aestheticians
ha~e too often confined their attention to presumed properties of the work ofart, the artist or the audience. They have
supposed, for example, that works are possessed of something called 'significant form' [3], or that genuine artists
must be in a special inspired state of mind, or that a work is
authentic only ifit succeeds in infecting its audience with a
special kind of emotion. The generic feature of all such
attempts at defining art, Dan to argued 25 years ago, is to be
found in the view that theory is secondary and adventitious
in 'the artworld' [4). By posing the case of physically indiscernible objects that are significantly different works of art
~n

(an example that Carrier reiterates at the beginning of Artwritingwith six differently titled red
squares and an untitled one)
ABSTRACT
Dan to suggested that it is theory,
rather than any property of the
This essay is a critical exam~
nation of David Carrier's Artwriting
object, that makes a work what
(1987), which offered a philosophi·
it is and that enables its intercal account of the implicit strategies
pretation. By analogy, states of
of narrative and presentation de·
mind in the audience or the
ployed by a wide range of art
artist are not the criterion of
historians and critics. Here, this
author raises some questions
whether something is art;
concerning Carrier's attempt to
rather the theory that helps to
describe or define a genre of 'art·
constitute the artworld is.
writing' distinct from philosophical
Danto called in effect for a
aesthetics; he also discusses
Carrier's views in the context of
Copernican turn in aesthetics
those writers whom Carrier
that would allow us to recognize
examines in Artwriting.
that the objects of the artworld
are constituted by theory. Such
a turn would free us from the
dilemma of either having to invent ever-new and more subtle epicycles by which we demonstrate that Duchamp's In Advance of the Broken Arm or a black
canvas by Ad Reinhardt are just subtle variations on Kant's
or Tolstoy's or Dewey's definitions of art or of following
philo.sophy's old Pa:menidean, rationalistic path of simply
:efusmg to recogmze the troubling phenomenon as an
mstance of the concept in question. And it presents an
alternative to the Wittgensteinian retreat to family resemblance as the nearest we can come to definition.
I would like to say something more about Danto, because
Carrier squarely places his own book within Danto's orbit,
although with a few reservations and questions. In 1964
D.anto seem~ to have realized that the classical, pre-Copermcan theones of art were all intricately bound up with
specific understandings of what the canon of art was. That
is, they were tied to certain views of who the great masters
of art were, which movements were significant, and what
constituted progress or development in art. Such theories
typically appear, Danto seems to suggest, at times when a
culture feels the need to consolidate, reform, defend, overhaul, question or revolutionize its canon. While providing a
way of focusing and justifying such moves, a theory of art
does not tell us merely why postimpressionist painting, for
example, is legitimate (as in Roger Fry's claim that it
s~ows that paintings can be real things, not merely imitations [5]). Such theories will also open up new ways of
G~ry
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looking at the art of the past; whatever
it is that we admire about postimpressionist painting-configurations of
line, color and form, arguably independent of'literary' significance-now
becomes a legitimate criterion for 'reviewing' the art of the tradition and so
of re-evaluating its contents. Skillful,
polished but unimaginative representational workswill fade, while we will
begin to admire the stark design of
some Byzantine paintings and will, for
the same reason, transfer some works
of tribal art from the ethnographic
museum to the museum of art. Danto
anticipated much about the line of discussion that now rages heatedly in literary critical circles about the relation
between theory and canon. That dispute preceded the one that is now
emerging about the relation between
art theory and canon, as presented in
Carrier's study, for a number of reasons. Danto's explanations of shifts in
what constitutes the canon are, by the
way, the sorts of reasons that Carrier
himself invokes at the conclusion of
Artwritingin order to explain the rhetoric of artwriting. In an age that still
prides itself on universal education, the
questions of which texts should be read
by the young, which should be held up
by their elders as models, and which
aspects of those texts should be valued,
are clearly political questions of the
highest order; this is a fact recognized
by philosophers from Plato to Rousseau
to Jacques Derrida to Allan Bloom.
Moreover, there is a certain ease in
moving back and forth from literary
texts to theoretical ones that allows for
at least the possibility of challenging or
reconfiguring the apparent distinction
between them. However, there may be
some analogous considerations that
will one day lead us to recognize a similarlyheavy import in the disputes of art
critics and art historians concerning
the variant stories (Carrier's example
again) that Greenberg and Gombrich
have to tell about the rise, formation
and closure of the visual canon in the
West. For surely the politics of the visual
image is terrain that is hotly contested-by the right in the form of diatribes against pornographic magazines or violence on television, by the
center in the form of projects such as
the Getty Foundation's concept for
transforming art education into a discipline-based curriculum with a larger
place in the public schools, and by the
left in its attack on the commodification of the image in the age of mass
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reproduction (for example in John
Berger's Waysof Seeing[6]).
There was already in Danto's earliest
articles about aesthetics an incipient
concern with the politics of art, including the question of who determines the
canon and who is authorized to interpret the image. The main lines of
Danto's story were, I believe, those of a
liberal pluralism taking a somewhat
skeptical, even satirical view of those
critics who put forward exclusive claims
to truth. It is Danto's position of 1964
that forms, I think, an indispensable
background for understanding Carrier's views in Artwriting.To situate the
implicit political and narrative dimensions of Danto's picture of the artworld,
I want to provide a genealogy, which
considers him as representative of a
fourth generation of artists, critics and
philosophers responding to the provocations of modernism.
Tolstoy's Whatis Art?[7] is as good a
place as any to begin, for it raises the
question of the canon in highly political fashion, identifying the burgeoning
industry of nineteenth-century aesthetics (mainly French and German) as a
move by the upper classes to legitimate
their own cultural and financial superiority by showing what sort of taste was
necessary to be a member of society's
higher circles. But this was to be
countered by a universalistic art, an art
of and perhaps even bythe people, that
infectiously communicated universal
values. This is romanceof high order. (I
follow Northrop Frye and Hayden
White in extending these narrative
classifications to forms beyond the conventionally fictional [8].) In this romance there is both the evil enemy, the
dragon to be slain (the aristocracy and
haute bourgeoisiewith their sensual
operas and ballets) and a pure, virtuous
hero (the people and their art). There
is the anticipation of a final clash and
the triumph of the hero. Tolstoy did
not hesitate to conclude that this final
clash would be marked by the destruction of the art schools and museums of
the old order. Skip a generation,
roughly, to Clive Bell, defending the
sensibility of the Bloomsbury group,
championing Cezanne and the post-impressionists under the banner of'significant form' [9]. Bell rigorously rethought the canon, substituting archaic
Greek figures for the rounded and mobile sculptures of the Parthenon and
Byzantine works for the masterpieces of
the Italian Renaissance. But, unlike
Tolstoy, Bell had no hope that the

world, even the artworld,would be converted to the cause of significant form.
At best the critic's job is the Sisyphean
task of maintaining the purity of a
genuinely aesthetic stance against the
constant seductions of content, representation and sentiment. In Bell's view,
the critic must defend the cause of artistic beauty (notably that of women)
against that quite different earthly
beauty with which we are wont to confuse it. Bell's was essentially a tragic
vision, one in which art's history is seen
as a series of repeated struggles with no
effective resolution, but one that offers
art's champion the satisfaction of fighting for the right cause. Twenty years
later, John Dewey (Danto's predecessor at Columbia), attempted to mediate
the differences between popular expressionists like Tolstoy and elitist aesthetes like Bell, with his suggestion that
there is an unbroken continuity between artistic experience and experience as such. Dewey,we might say,spoke
for an American culture taking possession of the entire heritage of world art,
a movement that Dewey could see on its
material side in the acquisitions of his
friend Albert Barnes and in the expansion of New York's galleries and
museums. Dewey's ArtasExperience[10]
is a text for 'the American century' in
art, promising to show that the highest
cultural values are not only consistent
with democracy but already ingredient
in the experimental and open-ended
conception of experience in which
such a democracy must ultimately be
grounded. As critics have frequently
pointed out, ArtasExperienceis the most
Hegelian book among Dewey's later
writings. I would add that, like Hegel,
the book is committed to a comic reading of experience and history, such that
clashes and conflicts can always be aufgehoben(transformed and subsumed)
in higher unities, and such that these
attained syntheses have an organic
character, with the pervasive quality of
the whole illuminating the specifics of
the parts and the particulars of those
parts enriching the whole. This comic
vision is eminently suited to a civilization that aims at incorporating the best
that has been thought, said and
painted, while avoiding the cloister-like
constriction of the elitist art practices.
If there are to be cloisters then let us
appropriate them from old Europe, set
them up on the banks of the Hudson
and open them up so that any honest
New Yorker can visit them by hopping
on a bus or a subway car.

The artworld that Danto found in
1964 could be said, roughly a generation later, to have realized this Deweyan
ideal in an ironic, even parodic fashion.
Andy Warhol's cool appropriation of
commodities and popular images
could be read either as an interrogation
of the soul of a commodified culture or
as that culture's blatant assertion of the
irrelevance of traditional significance,
content and form. Hard-edged abstraction confirmed the popular skepticism
that greeted abstract expressionism by
declaring that any kid (or chimpanzee)
could do it (at least so far as technical
execution went). At the same time,
hard-edged abstraction erected a barrier between the cognoscenti of the artworld and the public, with the former
appearing to the latter to be murmuring incantations over these new fetishes
that seemed to be meant only to confuse and alienate outsiders.
Enter Danto, who discovered (as
Carrier suggests) that there is no artwork in itself, but only an artworkin the
context of an interpretation. It is precisely these artworld murmurings that
are essential for constituting the works
(or fetishes); it is not some property of
the fetishes themselves that renders
them art. This understanding allows us
to see that these are not fetishes at all,
in any pejorative sense, but fully continuous with the grand tradition; yet,
the continuity recasts our very notion of
what it is to have a tradition. Following
this generational narrative, one might
say that Danto simply gave a new twist
to Dewey's contextualism, substituting
the environing ambience of language
and theory for Dewey's vaguer, more
elastic and more democratic conception of experience. And while there is
something to be said for such an observation, it is essential, I think, to notice
that the narrative emerging from
Danto's account is markedly different
from that implicit in Dewey's appeal to
the epiphany of 'having an experience'
[11] or in his hopeful expectations for
incorporating emotions and sensibilities that the intellectualist tradition had
reserved for art into the rough and
tumble of a creative, experimental,
American democracy.
Consider Danto's notion of a style
matrix, such that every addition of a
new artistic dimension results in an
array of 2" possible configurations of
artisticallyrelevant predicates [12]. On
the one hand this is an elaborately formal way of recognizing the broad spectrum of stylistic possibilities available at
present, therefore justifying the plural-

for his position, Danto may still appear
as something of a Hegelian. In his vision of the artworld as coming more
and more to incorporate such reflections, he would perhaps agree with the
Hegel who spoke of art (in the 1820s)
being, on its very highest side, a thing of
the past, replaced by the scholarly and
philosophical knowledge of art.
Danto, who has indeed occasionally
(with characteristic wit and irony) identified himself as a Hegelian, may sometimes appear to play both sides of the
street, surfacing now as a gently satiric
liberal art critic who can explore every
row of the style matrix in his criticism
(in TheNation [15], for example) while
seeming to perform a Hegelian Aufhebung of art by theory on more strictly
philosophical occasions. This ambiguity can perhaps be resolved from the
point of view that David Carrier takes in
Artwriting. One could distinguish
Danto as critic and artwriter from
In this regard,notice thatif there are
Danto as philosopher of art. Qua artrelevantpredicates,there
martistically
writer Danto would be free to marshal
is alwaysa bottomrowwithmminuses.
all the resources of rhetoric and
This rowis apt to be occupiedby purists. Having scoured their canvases
general culture to tell us what is worth
clearof whattheyregardasinessential,
seeing in Fragonard's delicate play with
theycreditthemselveswithhavingdisthe erotic or in Robert Mapplethorpe's
tilledout the essenceof art.Butthis is
sleeker homoerotic images. Quaphilosjust theirfallacy:exactlyas manyartisof
stand
true
opher Danto would be constrained to
relevant
predicates
tically
their square monochromesas stand
give us an account of the ontological
true of any memberof the Artworld,
status of artworks, telling us, finally,
and they can existas artworksonly inwhether and how they have been
sofar as 'impure'paintingsexist....
assimilated into language and theory.
Fashion,as it happens,favorscertain
I want to suggest then that Carrier's
rowsof the stylematrix:museums,contask in Artwritingisto define a position
noisseurs,andothersaremakeweights
in the Artworld.... Butthisis a matter
for a fifth generation of critics and
of almostpurelysociologicalinterest:
thinkers in the wake of modernism.
one rowin the matrixis as legitimate
This sort of generational criticism is
as another [14].
also consistent, I think, with Carrier's
Let me suggest that what Danto observation that Harold Bloom's "acoffered us here was a satiric view of count of the anxiety of influence and
history, one that kept the same cool and belatedness defines the dominant
ironic distance from the revolutions mood of the time" at least as effectively
and discoveries of the artworld that, in in the artworld as in the literary one
Danto's portrayal, Warhol established
[16]. If I am correct then I have justibetween himself and the hot images of fied my long preamble in arriving at
popular, commodity culture. From this Carrier's text. This is the project set by
perspective the style matrix may be seen two waysof understanding Danto's conas the anti-Hegelian device par excel- ceptions of the artworld and of the critilence; it appears as a structuralist ma- cal and philosophical practice approchine for generating indefinitely many priate to the artworld. The first
artistic possibilities by means of binary antinomy is that between what I have
operations compounding one another. called the Hegelian and the satiric diDanto thus appears not as the spokes- mensions of the narrativethat Danto has
person for a romantic, tragic or comic to tell about art and its history: are we to
construction of the canon of art, or for read it as a Hegelian metanarrative or
art's history; he appears, rather, to be as a postmodern deconstruction of all
offering a satiricreflection on the many metanarratives in the manner of Jeanattempts made by more naive thinkers Francois Lyotard [17], and in the style
to establish new ways of looking at art that I have called satiric?Notice, that in
and its history. To the extent that he thus situating Carrier's work within a
thus claims a certain self-consciousness certain narrative about art and artwrit-

ism and tolerance of the artworld. It is
a way of showing how it is that artworks
can acquire posthumous dimensions of
meaning, insofar as the matrix of interpretation grows. The matrix provides us
with a wayof schematizing the historical
development of the artworld through a
Hegelian twist that has been applied on
top of the Copernican turn to the constitutive role of art theory. On the other
hand, Danto's matrix gives little comfort to those Hegelians who would like
to speak of art having finally attained its
true essence or form. (Such Hegelianism has a long tradition in art and
might even be called Aristotelianism,
after Aristotle's tracing of the development of tragic art to its destined conclusion in the Poetics[13].) So Danto puts
such Hegelians or purists (like Clement
Greenberg, for example) in their place,
by declaring in the concluding paragraphs of his 1964 essay that:
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ing I am attempting to be faithful to
some of what I take to be the deepest
impulses of his work. The second antinomy to which Carrier seems to be responding is one posed by the looseness
of so much artwriting,juxtaposed with
the demands of philosophical rigor.
But this can no longer be a simple distinction between the woolly-headed
and the clear thinkers, because, from
the vantage point of Danto's theory,
such writing seems to play a crucial role
in the formation of the artworld itself.
If we dismiss it as merely or purely rhetorical, it is difficult to see how it could
play this role. I will address each of
these antimonies in turn.
First comes the question of the end
or death of art. This is a pervasivetheme
of Artwriting.Throughout the text a certain figure or pattern emerges, that of
'Hegelian' writers such as Greenberg or
Gombrich who purport to explain the
true or genuine trajectory of art by demonstrating, for example, how it attains a purity in abstract expressionism
(Greenberg) or in the realism and naturalism of the nineteenth century
(Gombrich). One of the most valuable
and perspicuous aspects of Carrier's
book is the way in which he displays
the structural homology of two such
apparently diverse narratives, showing
how they highlight certain works and
artists to the exclusion of others in
order to tell a convincing story that
culminates in art's having found its
true end. Similarlyhe portraysthe poststructuralists and writers for journals
like October(Rosalind Krauss [18], for
example) as relyingin one wayor another
on the thesis that art has come to an
end. Now to all these Hegelian metanarratives, Carrier plays Nietzsche. He
observes that the artworld is able to use
these stories for a while in order to
make sense of the past and the contemporary. Yet each story outlives its usefulness, coming to have a stultifyingeffect
on the understanding of new art. As in
Nietzsche's account of the "advantages
and disadvantages of history" [19], it is
'life'-here the life of art and the artworld-that calls out for something
new. Part of Carrier's story is that this
opposition between history and life becomes increasingly intense; he writes:
"The Octobrists insist that if they have
demonstrated that art's history has
ended, painters ought not to continue
to paint" [20].
In this respect the various artwriters
in Carrier's narrative appear (to vary
my own genealogical strategy)like Hegelian world-historical individuals. Each
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comes on the scene sensing something
of what the time requires, what sort of
narrative or critical intervention will
make sense of the art of the day and
provide a way of identifying the most
significant new work. But, as soon as the
world-historical artwriter has achieved
her vision, she, as Hegel would say,
"falls off like an empty hull from the
kernel". While Hegel says of his figures
that they "die early, like Alexander; are
murdered, like Caesar; or are transported to Saint Helena, like Napoleon"
[21], Carrier notes that they retreat
to chairs of art history, like Michael
Fried and Rosalind Krauss, since they
have nothing more to contribute to the
struggles of the contemporary scene,
and so seek the protection of a wellentrenched academic Fach with its
supposedly less-contested research
methods. Carrier is rightly fascinated
with the artworld's apparent ability to
generate fresh critics when the old ones
have done theirjob. Like Nietzsche he
is sensitive to the ways in which the
artwritermay serve either a vitalizing or
a nihilistic purpose. (If space were available it could perhaps be demonstrated
that Carrier has in effect rung a series
of changes on Nietzsche's account of
the possibilities inherent in the monumental, antiquarian and critical modes
of history.) But it is not clear to me that
Carrier can dismiss these various versions of the 'death of art' thesis as easily
as he does. As I have said, his reasons
are somewhat vitalistic: life in the artworld must go on. As Nietzsche puts the
point in On theAdvantageand Disadvantageof Historyfor Life:
Historicaleducationis reallya kindof
inborngreyheadedness,
and thosewho
bearitsmarkfromchildhoodon surely
mustattainthe instinctivebeliefin the
old age of mankind:it is nowfittingfor
old age, however,to engage in the
activityof old men,thatis,to lookback,
to tallyand close our accounts,to seek
consolationin thepastthroughmemories,in short,historicaleducation....
Does not this paralyzingbelief in an
alreadywitheringmankindratherharbor the misunderstanding,inherited
from the MiddleAges, of a Christian
theological conception, the thought
thatthe end of the worldis near,of the
fearfullyexpectedjudgement?[22]
Certainly Carrier is right to direct
our attention to a certain apocalyptic
tone that can be heard in many pronouncements of the death of art, from
Hegel toJean Baudrillard. And likeJacques Derrida, who speaks of an apocalyptic tone in recent philosophy, Carrier is right to show us that there is not

a single apocalyptic tone but a wide
variety of them, each with its own narrative strategy and its own ethical and
political affiliations. But it is not clear
to me that Carrier has himself offered
a convincing alternative to the various
death-of-art scenarios. As he would
agree, I think, it is not enough to point
to the existence of young artists or to
the demands for new art by museums,
cultural institutions and the public.
One wants to show that something
genuinely new and significant is both
possible and actual. Yet Carrier's own
discussion of the contemporary artworld in his penultimate chapter "Art
Fashion" [23] raises in its very title the
question of whether these bones can
still live. For if art is like fashion then
that means it is kept alive by the market,
the pressure for sales and the needs of
manufacturers and dealers to create
constant demands for new products.
Perhaps this is unfair to the fashion
world. For example, Roland Barthes in
TheFashionSystemdiscovered that it was
impossible to write about the semiotics
of fashion basing his ideas solely on the
visual phenomena of fashion [24]. He
realized that it was necessary to consider fashion as it was discussed in fashion magazines, that is (following Carrier) insofar as it was interpreted and
constituted by fashionwriting. However,
to the extent that the artworld conforms to that image of the fashion
world, we might very well want to ask
whether art is being given the appearance of life only by the most extraordinary mechanisms of publicity and
salesmanship. Recall that in "The Artworld" Danto had said, "Fashion, as
it happens, favors certain rows of the
style matrix; museums, connoisseurs,
and others are makeweights in the artworld.... But this is a matter of almost
purely sociological interest; one row in
the matrix is as legitimate as another"
[25]. If fashion usurps the life that was
to have been introduced into the artworld by the introduction of new stylistic dimensions, then we might ask
whether questions about the nature of
art have indeed become sociological
questions. And Carrier does provide
something of a very bleak picture of a
contemporary artworldin which artistic
values are reduced to monetary ones.
This desolate scene is portrayed by Carrier as a battlefield where artists
desperately contend for a place in the
pecking order, while power naturally
rests in the hands of a small number of
dealers. But is this not merely what the
death of art would look like in our

economic and cultural situation? For it
seems that this artworld is constituted
more by financial arrangements than
by theory. The function of theory in this
artworld, Carrier suggests, is analogous
to the discourse of Rameau's nephew
[26], whom Diderot depicts as the consummate flatterer and parasite at the
table of the rich. I quote Carrier:
Diderot'saccountaptlyappliesto our
artworld,in which artists,collectors
and criticsall takeup positions.If artwriting is a form of rhetoric, then
maybeits successand even its 'truth'
can be measuredonly by its powerto
convinceartworldpeople.... Fashion
suppliesa model for a worldin which
appearancesareeverything,and there
is no realitybehind these appearances
[27].
Of course Carrier might say that
there is no reason to think that this
triumph of the fashion principle in the
artworld will be a permanent one: it
may be that other configurations of art,
galleries, museums and critics will arise
so that we will one day be able to look
back at the period Carrier describes in
the artworld as we now look back (and
Hegel already looked back) on the ancien regimewhirligig of witty and insubstantial flattery that is dramatized in
Rameau'sNephew[28]. But we are not at
that point yet, if we ever will be, and so
there seems to be a certain disparity
between Carrier's Nietzschean dismissal of end-of-art discourse in the artwriters he discusses and his own very minimalist and reductive account of our
artworld. In a recently published article
by Carrier, I find some confirmation for
this reading of his assimilation of art to
fashion. There he recognizes, as he
says, an uncanny coincidence between
his own views and Jean Baudrillard's
theory, which describes a 'repulsive'
world "in which there is no contemplation, and artworkshave value only insofar as they are commodities" [29]. This,
if nothing else, might lead us to take a
closer look at the way in which Carrier
consigns talk of the death of art to the
purely rhetorical side of artwriting.
(These gestures, by the way, raise the
question of what is involved in Carrier's
strategy of skepticism with regard to the
philosophical and theoretical dimensions of writers like Clement
Adrian Stokes and
Greenberg,
Rosalind Krauss.)
In his fourth chapter, "The Art System", Carrier addresses the death-of-art
topos most directly, by constructing a
schematic account of the views of
Rosalind Krauss and other writers for

the journal October[30]. According to
Carrier, these artwriters have sought a
theoretical articulation for the suspicion, which began to be widespread
around 1975, that painting was dead.
One factor contributing to that suspicion, in his retelling, is that photography not only challenges painting as a
visual medium, but that in the age of
photographic reproduction, the status
of the unique object that a painting was
supposed to be, has been seriously
questioned; a painting may now appear
as an object that is waiting to be reproduced, rather than as an original to
which reproductions must eventually
refer us. The Octobrists, as Carrier
reads them, make two claims. The first
is that "because photography marks the
end of the history of painting, we are
examining a closed system of objects"
[31]. The second is an expansion of
what is meant by 'system'. Krauss is a
structuralist who believes that, like linguistics, art history ought to turn from
diachronic narrative to a synchronic
study that would articulate the formal
polarity between, for instance, the classic and the baroque; and she sees some
significance in the contemporary appearance of Saussurean linguistics and
the 'art history without names' of Heinrich Wolfflin. But for Krauss and her
colleagues, this is more than a theoretical discovery. It has for them the consequence that continuing to paint is
reinforcing an outmoded fetishism that
can support only reactionary values.
And to the extent that museums continue with business as usual, they convey a similar misleading ideology. Carrier's restatement of this view makes it
sound boldly prescriptive: "The Octobrists insist that if they have demonstrated that art's history has ended,
painters ought not to continue to
paint" [32]. And museums, one assumes, should deconstruct the tradition rather than celebrating it.
While Krauss'sviews may not be entirely satisfying, I am not sure that Carrier's reservations concerning them are
completely cogent or that his position
(and Danto's) are as distinct from
Krauss's as he would like to suggest. It
is easy enough to point out that painters
continue to paint, to admire the
museum and to return to expressive
styles that the Octobrist thesis seems to
consign to a closed system. But should
we read that position as literally announcing the death of painting? No
more galleries, artists, painters, no
more brushes, paints and canvases? Or
should we take it as making the more

provocative claim that a certain part of
the artworld, the system of painting, is
now to be seen as a closed system (in
Carrier's words), in which the essential
possibilities have been mapped out
once and for all? This is a debatable
view, but it is not falsified by our identification of painters who continue to
paint. We might also notice that the
difference between Danto's conception of the style matrix and Krauss's
structural system seems to lie only in
their views as to whether the matrix or
structure is open or closed. In fact there
is a very confusing series of charges and
countercharges among Danto, Krauss
and Carrier on the question of who has
said that art is at an end. In a review of
Danto's books, Krauss accused him of
holding this thesis, while now Carrier,
whose views are close to Danto's, accuses Kraussof holding it. It is also not
so clear to me from a reading of Krauss
that she does hold the end-of-art view
Carrier ascribes to her. In one of
Krauss'sessays that Carrier cites, "Notes
on the Index", Krauss does indeed say
that the photograph marks an epochal
change and "heraldsa disruption in the
autonomy of the sign" [33]. But the aim
of the essay is to describe how the art of
the 1970s reveals "the pervasiveness of
the photograph". It is not that art is
dead but that it has taken on a different
character. The photographic mode,
she writes "is not only there in the obvious case of photorealism, but in all
those forms which depend upon documentation-earthworks, particularly as
they have evolved in the last several
years, body art, story art-and of course
in video" [34]. In her review Krauss
explicitly contrasts her position that the
impact of photography is 'deeply historical' with Danto's view (as she presents it) that art has entered its 'posthistory' [35].
The situation becomes even more
puzzling when we consider the critic
Joseph Masheck,whom Carrierpresents
as an alternative to the Octobrists.
Carrier commends Masheck for having
found a mode of artwriting that avoids
the narrativism of writers like
Greenberg and Gombrich as well as the
invocation of (an ultimately ineffable)
presence by Michael Fried and Adrian
Stokes. Masheck'sstrategyconsistsof seeing contemporary art apart from the
tradition of flat, rectangular easel painting that is presupposed as the paradigm
by the other artwritersdiscussed by Carrier. Masheck reminds us of the Byzantine tradition of painting that is not
confined to the rectangle, the space
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of the painting being understood as
an icon, in which the frame is not a
window on the world, but the container
of "autonomously meaningful materials"or of color panels standing "within
the real space that we viewers also
occupy" [36]. While Masheck is certainly provocative and illuminating in
reminding us of forms such as crucifixes, wall paintings and paintings on
curved surfaces (like Baroque church
ceilings in Rome) that do not conform
to the rectangular, Albertian model,
what Carrier finds remarkablyvaluable
in his criticism sounds surprisingly like
what he deplores in the Octobrists:
"Masheck seeks 'to draw on the
memory bank of culture to claim for
contemporary artists the traditions ...
to which they contribute'. [In his] narrative . . . there is no subject whose

development we can trace.... He aims
to tell a story without subject,dramatic
beginning, or definite conclusion; such
a text, perplexing for the reader who is
accustomed to a strong narrative line,
makes sense if we give up the belief that
artwritingneeds such a structure" [37].
To me this sounds very much like
Krauss's structuralism, which Carrier
resists. The difference seems to be one
of tone-in Carrier's writing Masheck
emerges as an 'optimist' about the present "who gives us a way of seeing that
the future is open" [38]. That is, to
speak with Nietzsche again, Masheck
allows us to think and experience afresh
by combining the historical and the
ahistorical with exquisite intensity. Yet
even Carrier's remarks on this project
are sometimes ambiguous, as when he
remarks that Masheck allows the perception that "Perhaps Stella's shaped
works were less an entirely novel
development than part of an ongoing
tradition" [39]. This suggests that the
tradition is what Carrier calls a subject,
so that placing Stella's work within the
tradition would indeed be to seek the
narrativereassurances that Carrierelsewhere suggests we mightjust as well do
without. But assuming Masheck has dispensed with the subject, has he shown
that the structure or system without a
subject is open or closed, or has he
simply introduced some more subtle
variations in our understanding of what
the system is?
Perhaps the end-of-art thesis is not so
implausible after all. Ever since
Baudelaire, critics and aestheticians
have worried about what the advent of
photography means for painting.
These are not questions that arise only
recently in the pages of outreNew York
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magazines. It is also worth noting that
there is nothing approaching such a
volume and quality of apocalyptic criticism and aesthetics that focuses on, say,
the putative death of literature or film.
Moreover, this apocalyptic discourse
seems to be indicative of the contemporary artworld in at least as strong a
sense as the arrangements of manufacture and distribution that Carrier
details. I do not see what is inherently
implausible about the possibility of a
certain genre exhausting its possibilities in an essential way. Nor does continued productivity (especially under
the conditions of competition for status
and investments that Carrier details)
constitute an irrefutable falsification of
such a view. Yves-AlainBois, in his essay
"Painting: The Task of Mourning",
which accompanied 'Endgame', the
1986 exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Art, Boston, takes a view that
can be usefully contrasted with Carrier's [40]. Like Carrier (but drawing
on Derrida and Lacan rather than
Danto), Bois believes that it is important to discriminate and analyze the
different ways in which apocalyptic discourse and thought figure in the artworld. He wants to show precisely how
this motif functions in the various narratives that are told about painting
today. Bois suggests a psychoanalytical
mapping of some of the main responses
to the modernist situation in painting.
Marcel Duchamp is shown as mourning
in the imaginary mode: his 'readymades'-a snow shovel and a urinal, for
example-demonstrate the fetishistic
character of the traditional art object.
Rodchenko's 1921 exhibition of three
monochrome panels (the primary
colors) can be seen as an attempt to
reduce painting to the status of a real
object. And Mondrian's transformation of line, color and plane appear as
the symbolicproject of analyzing and
deconstructing the traditional resources of painting. I am not so much
interested here in establishing this particular account (although I find it a very
powerful one) as in showing that one
may sympathetically assess a number of
death-of-art narratives without either
endorsing just one or skeptically dismissing the theme itself. We may sometimes be in the position of having good
reasons for thinking that something

might be called a multiple genealogy,
with variant ramifications rather than a
single line of descent. (This is of course
closer to Nietzsche's use of the word
genealogy; Carrier's sense of the term
identifies genealogy with a fundamentally one-dimensional series.)
Let me suggest that Carrier's skepticism about the role of the death-of-art
topos in artwriting is related to a larger
aspect of his reading. While he does not
want to use the term 'rhetoric' pejoratively, it seems to me that this term plays
a somewhat exclusionary role in his
own narrative. At first glance, Carrier
seems to be occupying a moderate position, a critical stance free of either dogmatism or skepticism with regard to
artwriting.The typical philosophical response, at least within the American
academy, to the texts that appear in
journals like Artforumis one of revulsion
at what appears to be a confused
melange of borrowings from European
thinkers who are already suspect. Yet at
the same time many of these artwriters
will seem to invest their own pronouncements with a tone of dogma, if
not of mystery and revelation. As a rhetorical analyst, Carrier would like to
preserve what is of value in artwritingby
disclosing the way that it functions in
relation to the real workings of the artworld (demystifying in Danto's manner) while showing that once we see
how Kant, Freud or Derrida play their
narrative or rhetorical role for
Greenberg, Stokes or Krauss, we need
not be concerned with their ideas in
themselves. In this wayit seems possible
to hold the line between philosophy
and nonphilosophy. Such a move may
have the salutary consequence of provoking philosophers to find some significance in Greenberg, Stokes or
Krauss by contextualizing them within
the artworld. At the same time it seems
to reinforce a certain traditional puritanism about what constitutes genuine
philosophy. This is part of an implicit
but strong series of distinctions operative throughout Carrier's analysis but
which he does notjustify as such. There
is a difference, it is said, between artwriting and art history: "[In] art history
conflicting interpretations can be debated because there is consensus about
how to argue" [41]. And philosophical
discourse, it appears, is also structured
like a holistic transformation or narraby a set of presuppositions about what
tive conclusion has occurred or is oc- constitutes a reasonable argument. Yet
curring without being able to identify it is not clear to me that the distinctions
the single most satisfactory story about are all that neat. Do contemporary
that event. Unlike the artwriters dis- art historians really display a profound
cussed by Carrier, Bois offers what agreement about methods and proce-

dures once they move beyond questions of connoisseurship such as dating
and attribution? Or have the questions
identified with names like Marx and
Freud disrupted what was, until fairly
recently, a discipline not known for serious internal theoretical disputes? And
cannot the apparent carnivalesque diversity of artwriting styles that Carrier
documents be traced in part to the diversity of philosophical sources on
which artwritersdraw?Allowing for the
fact that criticism and journalism will
necessarily have a tendency to borrow
hastily where they can, and that one's
place in a network of money, status and
power may lead to a premature and
dogmatic entrenchment in a borrowed
ideology or philosophy, are not the structure of differences and the strategies of
rapprochement to be observed in the
artwriting scene something like a dramatic enactment of the same relations
in contemporary thought? Unless, that
is, we adopt an exclusionary strategy
within philosophy too, so that Kant,
Hegel, Marx, Freud, Heidegger and
Derrida are seen as nonphilosophers or
as 'philosophywriters' who must themselves be subject to a rhetorical analysis
like that which Carrier performs on artwriters. We might also ask (and I do not
think Carrier would be unsympathetic
to this question) whether many of the
classical authors of philosophical aesthetics should be seen as intimately involved in the questions of canonicity
that are essential to the artworld. The
rhetoric of Hume's essay "Ofthe Standard of Taste" [42] can be analyzed in
terms of his own rather pompous neoclassicism: Kant's aesthetics has much
to do with the eighteenth-century
taste for gardens and landscapes; and
Hegel's project of a unified philosophical history of art can be read as a
manifesto for the new culture of the
museum
and the recently coined
notion of Weltliteratur introduced by
Goethe [43]. It would take a book or
two to address whether these commitments and affiliations constitute an effective challenge to the traditional distinction we would like to make between
cases and principles. But I will simply
assert here that the strongest contemporary readings of these classical texts
in aesthetics do just that (for one ex-

ample, let me mention Jacques Derrida's Truthin Painting [44]).
I am proposing, then, that a fully
general and rigorous extension and application of the kind of readings that
Carrier offers in Artwritingmight very
well lead us to question the implicit
theory of genres within which it operates. Put in its most traditional form, it
is the generic distinction between rhetoric and philosophy. Even if Carrier
would rather practice an Aristotelian
tolerance than pronounce a rigorous
Platonic exclusion, the difference comes
to appear as more uncanny than we had
suspected. Perhaps, as Carrier suggests,
we should all be rereading Rameau's
Nephew [45], although I would want
to focus on the silence of the philosopher as well as on the mimic virtuosity and multiple voices of the parasitic
musician.
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